Abstract. According to the work of Faigle [3] a static Shapley value for games on matroids has been introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1] . In this paper we present a dynamic Shapley value by using a dynamic model which is based on a recursive sequence of static models. In this new model for games on matroids, our main result is that there exists a unique value satisfying analogous axioms to the classical Shapley value. Moreover, we obtain a recursive formula to calculate this dynamic Shapley value. Finally, we prove that its components are probabilistic values.
Introduction
A matroid M on a …nite set N is a collection of subsets of N which satis…es the following properties: (M1) ; 2 M: (M2) If T 2 M and S µ T , then S 2 M: (M3) If S; T 2 M and jT j = jSj + 1; then there exists i 2 T n S such that S [ fig 2 M: We refer the reader to Welsh [8] and Korte, Lovász and Schrader [4] for a detailed treatment of matroids and their numerous applications in combinatorics and optimization theory.
A cooperative game is a pair (N; v) where N is the …nite set of players and v : 2 N ! R is the characteristic function satisfying v (;) = 0. The subsets of N are called coalitions. The coalitions in M are named feasible coalitions. In words, a cooperative game on a matroid represents an evaluation of the potential utility of the 1 feasible coalitions, whereas the non-feasible coalitions are totally ignored because such coalitions are supposed not to be formed anyhow. The real vector space of all games on a matroid M is denoted by ¡ (M).
We will use the following concepts of matroid theory in our model. The rank function r : 2 N ! Z + of a matroid M on N is de…ned by r (S) = max fjT j : T µ S; T 2 Mg :
Given a coalition S, the maximal feasible coalitions contained in S are called bases of S. All the bases of one coalition S have the same cardinality r (S). When a feasible coalition B has cardinality r (N), i.e. is a basis of N, then B is called basic coalition and we denote the set of basic coalitions by B (M). The rank function of a matroid M is a monotonic and submodular cooperative game.
We also need two operations of matroids: the deletion and the contraction. Let M be a matroid and S 2 M, the deletion of S is the new matroid M n S = fT 2 M : T \ S = ;g ;
i.e. the set of the feasible coalitions which do not contain players of S. The contraction of S is the new matroid M=S = fT 2 M : T \ S = ;; T [ S 2 Mg ;
i.e. the set of the feasible coalitions which can incorporate S in order to form a feasible coalition.
In a classic cooperative game (N; v) it is supposed that the players form the big coalition N (see Driessen [2] ). In our model about games on matroids, we suppose that the players cooperate to reach a feasible coalition as big as possible. Thus, when a cooperation structure is de…ned by a matroid M, we assume that a basic coalition of M will be formed, unknown beforehand by the players.
Nevertheless, it is possible to bring up di¤erent forms of playing. It can occur that the players would only want to study which basic coalition will be formed and how they will share the pro…ts. This is the static model which we have already studied in Bilbao et al. [1] .
Another possibility named dynamic model, is the one that considers the following: once a basic coalition A 1 of M is formed, the game continues between the players of the set N n A 1 : These players have in mind to form a new basic coalition A 2 of M n A 1 and once again the game will continue between the players (N n A 1 )nA 2 and the game will end when all the players have participated (they will determine a partition of N). Note that in this way we suppose that the feasible coalitions which are formed, always belong to the original matroid.
The above procedure describes the dynamic model for games on matroids. The aim is to raise that each player can study "a priori" what coalitions are the most interesting, and also estimate his/her possible bene…ts.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concepts of a basic sequence on a given matroid as well as the dynamic in ‡uence of a feasible coalition S with respect to a given probability distribution on the set of all basic sequences on the matroid. We present the relationship between the dynamic in ‡uence of a feasible coalition S and its static in ‡uence with respect to an induced probability distribution on the set of all basic coalitions of the matroid. In Section 3 we introduce, besides three rather standard axioms dealing with linearity, dummy players and symmetric players respectively, a fourth axiom dealing with some kind of e¢ciency that takes into account the dynamic model in terms of the basic sequences on the matroid. We prove that there exists a unique value, called the dynamic Shapley value, satisfying these four axioms.
In addition, we present the relationship between the dynamic Shapley value and the so-called static Shapley value, which has been introduced in Bilbao et al. [1] on the basis of four similar axioms, incorporating a slightly adapted e¢ciency axiom. The proof of the relationship between the dynamic and static Shapley values (applied to so-called unanimity games) is fully based on the relationship between the dynamic and static in ‡uence of any feasible coalition. Finally it is shown that the components of the dynamic Shapley value are probabilistic values in the sense of Weber [7] . A detailed summary of the main results is given in Section 4. Example 1. Suppose that V is a set of cities where several companies are localized. These companies are interested in building a communication network system connecting some cities of V . Their necessity of communication are represented by a edge-weighted graph ((V; E) ; w) where the weight of each edge is its constructing cost. Let us consider that there are di¤erent companies in the same city requiring di¤erent services. In this conditions, in order that the payment of a company only depends on its requirements, we can consider the matroid M on the players set N = E whose basic coalitions are the spanning trees of the graph (V; E) :
The game (M; v) where v (S) is the sum of edge weights in S; will allow them to study their possibilities and determinate an allocation of total cost. The model of game can be static or dynamic, depending on they want to build only one network or make as networks as they are necessary until to construct each edge of E: The matroid of this example is named graphic matroid (see Korte et al. [4] ) and it has already used by Nagamochi et al. [5] to de…ne the minimum base game on matroids.
Example 2. Let us assume that in the set N of …rms of a market (for example, the oil companies which are the owners of all the gasoline stations of a country) there is a group C of big companies whose fusion can end with the competence. In this cases it is usual to restrict the cooperation and consider, for example, that the feasible holdings are the groups of …rms which do not contain C. This suggests that we should talk about of the matroid M = fS µ N : C " Sg ;
and consider the dynamic model of the game because the companies could merge as long as they form feasible coalitions of the matroid.
Example 3. A owner has k warehouses which are demanded from a set N = f1; : : : ; ng of …rms, where n > k: Every …rm i 2 N obtains a pro…t c i if it succeeds in storing its products, otherwise it loses everything. Besides we suppose that each one knows the bene…ts of the others. Then they have complete information to negotiate theirs pro…ts to get a warehouse. In this situation, we propose the uniform matroid U k n (see Korte et al. [4] ), whose basic coalitions are all the subsets of N with cardinality k, to allocate the expected pro…ts.
The dynamic influence
Throughout the paper we suppose the matroid M on N satis…es M 6 = f;g and S S2M S = N: De…nition 2.1. A basic sequence of M is an ordered set of nonempty feasible coalitions (A 1 ; : : : ; A k ) such that:
The set of the basic sequences of the matroid is denoted by ¦ (M). A basic semi-sequence is an ordered set (A 1 ; : : : ; A s ) of feasible nonempty coalitions satisfying (a) and (b) in the above de…nition. So, every basic sequence is a basic semi-sequence. If ¼ = (A 1 ; : : : ; A s ) is a basic semi-sequence of M, then:
(2) A m 2 M for all m 2 f1; : : : ; sg : (3) A q \ A m = ; for m; q 2 f1; : : : ; sg with m 6 = q.
We will understand that two deletion minors are di¤erent if the semisequences which de…ne them are di¤erent. Besides, we will suppose that M is a deletion minor of itself.
Example 4. Let M be the matroid with basic coalitions B 1 = f1; 2; 3g, B 2 = f1; 2; 4g, B 3 = f1; 2; 5g, B 4 = f1; 3; 4g, B 5 = f1; 4; 5g.
The basic sequences are:
It is possible to see in this example that it can have basic sequences with di¤erent number of coalitions.
We will denote by D (M) the set of probability distributions on the set ¦ (M) of basic sequences on the matroid M. De…nition 2.3. Let M be a matroid and let D 2 D (M) be a probability distribution on ¦ (M). The dynamic in ‡uence of S 2 M with respect to D is the sum of probabilities of basic sequences containing coalition S, i.e.
where ¦ S (M) denotes the set of basic sequences ¼ = (A 1 ; : : : ; A k ) such that S µ A m for some m 2 f1; : : : ; kg.
We recall the concept of in ‡uence of a feasible coalition for the static model introduced in Bilbao et al. [1] . With respect to a given probability distribution P M on B(M); the static in ‡uence of S 2 M is the sum of the probabilities of basic coalitions containing coalition S, i.e.
where
Note that the dynamic in ‡uence of every player is equal to one because every basic sequence yields a partition of N. The main result of this section concerns the relationship between the dynamic and static in ‡uence. For that purpose we prove a preliminary lemma about the decomposition of probability distributions on ¦ (M). Lemma 2.1. A map D : ¦ (M) ! R is a probability distribution on ¦ (M) if and only if there exists a unique probability P M 0 2 P (M 0 ) for each nonempty deletion minor M 0 such that
for every basic sequence ¼ = (A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A k ) of M.
Proof. (() Consider the probability distribution D. We will de…ne a probability on the basic coalitions of any deletion minor of M. First we consider the real function P M on B (M), de…ned by
are nonempty deletion minors of M, we will construct the probability P M i+1 using the probability P M i , by the following recursive procedure. If
Now we can assure that these probabilities allow express D like in (1). Note that if ¼ = (A 1 ; : : : ; A k ) is a basic sequence of M, the expression of
is such that or each factor is the denominator of the following one and the last is D(¼) or the result is cero and also D(¼) = 0: ()) We use induction on the number of players. When there is only one player the result is trivial for the unique possible matroid. We suppose true the result for all matroid with less than n players and will prove it for n. We consider the function 
for all ¼ 0 = (A 2 ; : : : ; A k ) basic sequence of M n A 1 , is a probability distribution on ¦ (M n A 1 ). Thus, we obtain
and, then, D is a probability distribution on ¦ (M). ¤
We deduce from the above proof, that every probability D 2 D (M) determines, for each basic coalition A 1 2 B (M), the probability distribution
In Lemma 2.1 we use one probability for every deletion minor to obtain a probability distribution on the basic sequences of a matroid M. For instance, we can take the equitable distribution for all deletion minor and obtain, for all ¼ = (A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A k ) of ¦ (M) ;
;
is the number of basic coalitions in the deletion minor M n A 1 n ¢ ¢ ¢ n A m :
We can also propose that the probabilities on the deletion minors come given by an initial probability on the basic coalitions of the original matroid. Thus, we take P M 2 P (M) and de…ne the induced probability distribution on M n A 1 as
; for all B 2 B (M n A 1 ). In the same form the rest of the probabilities are de…ned by induction and using (1) we give D built by P M . 
B (M).
The following theorem allows to calculate the dynamic in ‡uence for a distribution D by recurrence using the static in ‡uences of the deletion minors, with the probabilities which de…ne D by the formula (1). Theorem 2.2. Let M be a matroid and D 2 D (M) a probability distribution such that for every basic sequence ¼ = (A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A k ) 2 ¦(M) we have
Then, for every S 2 M, its dynamic in ‡uence w D (S) with respect to D is given by
where D MnB is the probability distribution on ¦ (M n B) originates from D according to formula (2).
Proof. Let S 2 M. In the case that S is an isthmus coalition in the matroid M, we have that
using (5).
If S is not an isthmus in M then, 
where, in the …rst term of the second equality we use (5). Besides, the second term of the third equality is obtained by (4) . ¤
The dynamic Shapley value
In the setting of the dynamic approach to a given matroid, as developed in Section 2, we aim to introduce axiomatically a unique value fully determined by four axioms. In comparison to the axioms of the classical Shapley value (cf. Shapley [6] ) and the static Shapley value for games on matroids (cf. Bilbao et al. [1, Theorem 4.2]), only the e¢ciency axiom needs to be adapted slightly in accordance with the cornerstone of the dynamic model, being the set of basic sequences on the matroid. Notice that for any basic sequence of the form ¼ = (A 1 ; : : : ; A k ), the associated overall bene…ts in a game v 2 ¡(M) are given by v(A 1 ) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + v(A k ), whereas its probability is given by D(¼) according to any probability distribution D on ¦(M). 
where ¼ = (A 1 ; : : :
The next theorem states that there exists a unique value satisfying the above four axioms: the dynamic Shapley value. Moreover, we provide a recursive formula to calculate the dynamic Shapley value using a sequence of static Shapley values. We now recall some formulas for the static Shapley value obtained in Bilbao et al. [1] .
Given a matroid M and a probability distribution over the set of basic coalitions P M 2 P (M) ; the static Shapley value
where Sh B i (v B ) is the classical Shapley value for the cooperative game v B : 2 B ! R: Moreover, for the unanimity games u S with S 2 M, this value satis…es
Theorem 3.1. Let M be a matroid and D 2 D (M) a probability distribution such that for every basic sequence ¼ = (A 1 ; A 2 ; : : : ; A k ) 2 ¦(M) we have
Then there exists a unique value
on ¡ (M) which satis…es the axioms 1, 2, 3 and 4. Moreover, for every game v 2 ¡ (M) the dynamic Shapley value Sh D i (v) of player i is given by, either Sh D i (v) = Sh
(v) whenever i is an isthmus player of M, or otherwise
Proof. To prove the existence and uniqueness part, we use that the set of the unanimity games fu S : S 2 M; S 6 = ;g forms a basis of the vectorial space ¡ (M). Let ª = (ª i ) i2N be a value satisfying the axioms 1, 2, 3 and 4, and let S 2 M be a nonempty feasible coalition. We consider its associated unanimity game u S 2 ¡(M). Obviously, any player i 2 N n S is a dummy in the unanimity game u S , and so, by the dummy player property for ª, it follows that ª i (u S ) = u S (fig) = 0 for all i 2 N n S. Further, the symmetry property for ª yields ª i (u S ) = ª j (u S ) for all i; j 2 S. On the one hand, we obtain that
for all i 2 S. On the other hand, the dynamic e¢ciency for ª applied to the unanimity game 
where the last but one equality follows from the following property: every sum u S (A 1 ) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + u S (A k ) is either zero or one (since a basic sequence yields a partition of N). Moreover, the sum u S (A 1 ) + ¢ ¢ ¢ + u S (A k ) = 1 if and only if S µ A m for exactly one m 2 f1; : : : ; kg. From both reasonings, we conclude that
This formula determines ª for every unanimity game and the linearity property implies uniqueness. We denote this unique value by
. To prove the formulas which include the static Shapley value it is su¢ces to work on the unanimity games. We know that for any P M 2 P (M) and S 2 M, the static Shapley value Sh P M veri…es (7).
If i 2 S is an isthmus player then S is an isthmus coalition too, and so
using the property (9) and the formula (6) in Theorem 2.2. If i 2 S is not an isthmus player, then the recursive procedure in the dynamical model will end when i becomes an isthmus player in the last deletion minor. Thus, if M 0 is the last deletion minor then
Let us suppose that the above equality is true for all deletion minor M n B with B 2 B (M n i) ; i.e.
and we prove the recursive formula for the matroid M.
using the property (9) and the formula (6). We now consider i = 2 S. If i is an isthmus then Sh D i (u S ) = Sh
(u S ) = 0: Otherwise, we suppose that
The static Shapley value is given by
where Sh B i (v B ) is the classical Shapley value on the cooperative game v B : 2 B ! R. For all player i we have that the set of basic coalitions which contain player i is B i (M) = fB [ i : B 2 B (M=i)g and the set of the basic coalitions not containing player i is B (M n i). The dynamic Shapley value for the distribution D can be written using the classical operations of matroids in the formulas proved in Theorem 3.1 as follows.
If i is an isthmus player of M, then
The i-coordinate of the Shapley value for D is the sum of a static contraction term on M, and a recurrence dynamic deletion term on M n i. In the last step of the recurrence player i is a dummy player in the games v MnB and hence the dynamic term is zero. In the next proposition we show that our dynamic Shapley value for this class of games veri…es the individual rationality principle, i.e. the payments are at least the individual worths. Proof. Let P M 2 P (M) : First, note that the classical Shapley value veri…es the individual rationality principle on the class of superadditive games. Then the components of the static Shapley value satisfy
If i is an isthmus player then
, because for any isthmus player w P M (fig) = 1. When i is not isthmus in M the property is true in the last step of the recurrence that de…nes the dynamic Shapley value. We suppose that it is true for all deletion minors di¤erent of M and we will prove this property for M,
we introduced the following concept of individual value for games of ¡ (M) : If¸i 2 [0; 1], an individual value Ã i : ¡ (M) ! R for player i 2 N; is a¸i-quasi-probabilistic value if there exists a collection of positive numbers
In particular, the probabilistic values (Weber [7] 
Summary and concluding remarks
Firstly, the paper dealt with a dynamic approach to a given matroid M such that, in a recursive manner, an arbitrarily chosen basic coalition is removed from the (resulting deletion) matroid, until the "empty-set" matroid arises. We are concerned with the set ¦(M) of all such basic sequences on the matroid M as well as the associated set D(M) of probability distributions on ¦(M). Secondly, with respect to a given probability distribution D on ¦(M), we introduced the so-called dynamic Shapley value Sh D (v) for games v on the matroid M as the unique value satisfying the following four axioms: (1) Linearity on the game space. (2) Dummy player property. (3) Symmetry property applied to unanimity games. (4) Dynamic e¢ciency which is formulated as an expected payo¤ in terms of the set ¦(M) of all basic sequences on M and the …xed probability distribution D as well.
Concerning the unanimity game u S , associated with the feasible coalition S 2 M, its dynamic Shapley value Sh D (u S ) allocates nothing to the nonmembers of S (since they are treated as dummies), whereas members of S are paid the average of the so-called dynamic in ‡uence of coalition S with respect to the given probability distribution D (denoted by w D (S)). In fact, the dynamic in ‡uence of S w.r.t. D represents the overall payo¤ according to the dynamic Shapley value for the unanimity game u S .
A …rst main result states that, for any feasible coalition S, its dynamic in‡uence w D (S) can be related, in a recursive manner, to some static in ‡uence w P M (S) (where D is replaced by an induced probability distribution P M on the set B(M) of basic coalitions of the matroid M). To be more precise, the dynamic and static in ‡uence do agree for isthmus coalitions which intersect every basic coalition of the matroid M. For any non-isthmus coalition S, the dynamic in ‡uence di¤ers from the static in ‡uence by some amount which is composed as the sum, over all basic coalitions B of the deletion matroid M n S, of the product between its probability P M (B) and the dynamic in ‡uence of coalition S with reference to some induced probability distribution D MnB on the set of all basic sequences on the deletion matroid M n B.
Consequently, the second main result states that the dynamic Shapley value Sh D i (v) of a player i 2 N in an arbitrary game v on the matroid M can be related, in a recursive manner, to the static Shapley value Sh
as introduced in Bilbao, Driessen, Jiménez-Losada and Lebrón [1] . More exactly, the dynamic and static Shapley values do agree for isthmus players who belong to every basic coalition of the matroid M. For any non-isthmus player i, the dynamic Shapley value di¤ers from the static Shapley value by some amount which is composed as the sum, over all basic coalitions B of the deletion matroid M n i, of the product between its probability P M (B) and the dynamic Shapley value of player i with reference to some induced probability distribution D MnB on the set of all basic sequences on the deletion matroid M n B.
